On 1 February 2025, the administration of President Donald Trump signed an order imposing an additional 25% tariff on most goods imported from Canada an Mexico, with the exception of oil and certain Canadian energy products, which were subject only to a 10% rate. This decision was officially justified as a way to put pressure on issues such as fentanyl control, immigration and trade deficit reduction, but in essence it launched a large-scale “tariff war” that directly affected Canada’s growth model, which is heavily reliant on exports to the United States. Various statistics in recent years show that roughly three-quarters of Canada’s merchandise exports are destined for the US market, meaning that any policy change in Washington is quickly transmitted to growth, employment and supply chains in the northern neighbour’s economy.
The tariff shock has not only generated pure economic pressure but has also triggered a wave of economic nationalism in Canada. Public opinion surveys show that attitudes towards the United States and President Trump have fallen to their lowest levels in decades; a majority of Canadians express a desire to reduce dependence on the US market and are willing to boycott American goods and brands. Across the country, “Buy Canadian” groups have emerged, along with mobile applications that help consumers identify “Made in Canada” products and campaigns calling for priority to domestic consumption. In that context, the “Buy Canada” slogan has gone beyond a social mobilization campaign and has gradually been institutionalized into concrete policy packages, especially in the field of public procurement.
At the federal level, under Prime Minister Mark Carney, the Government of Canada has launched a broader programme to “protect, build and transform strategic industries”, in which a key pillar is the “Buy Canada” policy applied to infrastructure and defence spending as well as to grant and concessional loan programmes. Official documents show that the scope of “Buy Canada” is not confined to procurement contracts of federal administrative bodies, but also extends to support funds, loans, subsidies and state-owned enterprises (Crown corporations), thereby affecting tens of billions of Canadian dollars in annual public expenditure.
At the provincial level, reactions have been faster and more pronounced. Ontario – the largest economy in the federation – has become the focus of attention with its announcement that it would “tear up” contracts with Starlink in response to US tariffs, while pushing the “Buy Ontario Act” to prioritize local businesses and supply chains in public procurement. British Columbia and several western provinces have in turn announced packages of measures to increase the share of local content in construction, transport, health and science-and-technology projects, or to suspend the signing of new contracts with certain US suppliers until tariff disputes ease. Overall, provincial governments are seeking to redirect public orders towards firms with production bases in Canada, thereby preserving jobs and creating a “safety valve” for sectors directly affected by tariffs such as steel, aluminium, automobiles and construction.
A noteworthy point is that, despite their “self-reliance” flavour, the “Buy Canada” policies have been designed within the legal framework to which Canada has committed under the WTO and agreements such as USMCA and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Domestic preference measures are implemented mainly for tender packages, sectors and value thresholds outside the scope of Canada’s commitments, or based on legitimate exceptions such as national security, public order, and the protection of health and the environment. Alongside “Buy Canada” at home, the Carney government has also actively diversified partnerships, most notably through the decision to participate in the European Union’s SAFE defence fund, opening the way for Canadian firms to access capital and defence–security contracts from Europe and gradually reducing dependence on US supply chains and equipment.
Initial assessments indicate that “Buy Canada” has helped a segment of businesses offset lost export orders, maintain employment and encourage investment in new technology to meet the standards of public procurement contracts. However, experts also point to a number of risks: public procurement costs may rise as competition diminishes; supply chains may be disrupted if domestic replacement sources cannot yet meet demand; and there is a risk of legal disputes if domestic preference measures are deemed to exceed the scope of exceptions permitted under the WTO or USMCA. As a result, “Buy Canada” is both an instrument for economic protection and a delicate exercise in legal technique and policy design.
From Canada’s story, it is possible to reassess Viet Nam’s position in the global trade ecosystem. Viet Nam is among the most open economies in the world; in 2023, the value of exports of goods and services was equivalent to around 86–87% of GDP, nearly twice the global average. The United States is currently Viet Nam’s largest export market, accounting for roughly 27–28% of total export turnover; China ranks second with about 17–19%, followed by the Republic of Korea, Japan and several other Asian partners. The latest developments show that, despite recording a record surplus with the US, Viet Nam’s exports to this market are under significant pressure from new tariffs that Washington has imposed on certain product groups since August 2025. This underlines how vulnerable the economy is when the international trade environment deteriorates, in a way similar to the strain now faced by Canada.
Domestically, Viet Nam has long been familiar with the idea of “promoting internal strength” through domestic consumption and production. The campaign “Vietnamese people prioritize using Vietnamese goods”, launched in 2009 under Politburo Conclusion No. 264-TB/TW, has helped reverse a preference for foreign products, strengthen consumers’ confidence in domestic goods and enable Vietnamese products to account for more than 80% of shelf space in many supermarkets and shopping centres. Nevertheless, as in the early phase of Canada’s response to the tariff war, Viet Nam’s measures still lean heavily towards social mobilization and incentive-based policies, while the “locomotive” role of public procurement has yet to be fully exploited.
Viet Nam’s legal framework on tendering and public procurement has in fact made significant progress. The 2023 Bidding Law and Decree No. 24/2024/NĐ-CP detailing the selection of contractors have added numerous incentives for domestically produced goods and services, innovative products, small and medium-sized enterprises, science-and-technology enterprises and innovation centres. Notably, goods in circulation in the domestic market with Vietnamese origin are entitled to specific preferences; certain types of software products, information technology products and innovative products benefit from relaxed financial capacity and operating time requirements when participating in tenders. This shows that the mindset of “domestic preference” has begun to be codified, rather than relying solely on voluntary campaigns.
In parallel with domestic law, Viet Nam has committed to opening part of its public procurement market under new-generation agreements such as EVFTA, CPTPP and UKVFTA. Chapter 9 of EVFTA on government procurement, together with its annexes on coverage, specifies the authorities, budget levels, types of goods and services and value thresholds for which Viet Nam must apply the principle of non-discrimination towards EU contractors. However, this coverage still only extends to a portion of the entire public procurement system; many sectors, levels of government and state-owned enterprises remain outside the scope of commitments, and EVFTA and other FTAs also allow for exceptions on grounds of security, public order, protection of health and the environment, or the implementation of programmes supporting vulnerable groups.
The combination of, on the one hand, a domestic legal framework that already incorporates elements of domestic preference and, on the other, FTA commitments that are still relatively narrow compared with total public expenditure, creates a “policy space” for an approach similar to “Buy Canada” but in the form of “Buy Vietnam”. In principle, Viet Nam can design preference criteria in tender evaluation based on the share of domestic value added, contributions to green transition goals, innovation or support for small and medium-sized enterprises, provided that they are not applied to tender packages and sectors already committed to opening, or are structured in line with legitimate exceptions under the agreements.
Canada’s experience shows that effective domestic preference should not rest solely on the nationality of a firm, but rather on economic and technical criteria such as the level of value added created locally, the share of local labour employed, emissions performance or technological quality. Viet Nam has already moved in this direction by giving preference to contractors supplying domestically produced goods that meet environmental and high-tech standards or are innovative products, while encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises to take part in suitable tenders. If these criteria are further developed into a scoring system for bid evaluation, policymakers can create a “Buy Vietnam” mechanism that is both sufficiently strong and transparent, and defensible vis-à-vis trading partners.
Another salient feature of the Canadian case is the link between domestic procurement preference and business support programmes in the face of a tariff shock. Ottawa has not only redirected public orders but has also deployed credit lines and financial support packages for affected businesses, encouraging them to diversify markets and upgrade competitiveness. For Viet Nam, this suggests the need for closer alignment between procurement incentives and programmes for small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as for innovation, digital transformation and green transition: firms would not only gain preferential access to public contracts but would also receive support in terms of finance, technology and management to genuinely meet quality and timeliness requirements, rather than simply enjoying “paper privileges”.
Finally, the lesson from “Buy Canada” underscores the importance of transparency and oversight. Sudden, poorly explained changes in procurement policy can unsettle investors and provide grounds for legal disputes. Viet Nam has already taken initial steps towards e-procurement and broad disclosure of bidding documents and contract awards; if this is combined with a clear set of domestic preference criteria and regular evaluation reports on their impact on costs, the quality of public services and the competitiveness of enterprises, a “Buy Vietnam” policy can become a substantive instrument rather than a mere slogan.
In a world where strategic competition and protectionism are making a comeback, the question for Viet Nam is not whether to “close or open” but how to “remain open without being easily vulnerable”. The “Buy Canada” story shows that, when used properly, public procurement – together with institutional reform and business support – can help an economy both protect its interests in the face of external shocks and turn pressure into a driver for self-upgrading. Given its very high trade openness, Viet Nam has even more reason to consider such an approach if it wishes to strengthen domestic capacity in the new phase of integration.
